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Abstract 
As the governance of financial institutions is becoming an important issue, there are 
many papers empirically investigating the governance issues of banks, which are stock 
companies. However, cooperative structured financial institutions (co-ops), which have 
a unique governance structure different from stock companies, play a substantial role in 
the Japanese banking markets, and, therefore, it is worth examining whether some 
governance scheme developed for stock companies are effective at cooperative financial 
institutions. Our results showed that the presence of outside directors at co-ops 
(“Shinkin Banks”) contributes to an improvement in efficiency.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
In many countries around the world, stock companies are not the only institutions that 
constitute an important part of the financial system. For example, in countries such as 
Germany, France, and the Netherlands, cooperative structured financial institutions 
(co-ops) carry significant weight. In Japan, the subject of this study’s analysis, co-ops 
hold as much as a 25% share of household deposits. On the other hand, over 150 co-ops 
went bankrupt during the first half of the financial system crisis period from the 1990s 
to the 2000s. According to research by the Deposit Insurance Corporation of Japan (DIC 
[2006]) that investigated the cause of these bankruptcies, there were problems in the 
management in 63% of co-ops that went bankrupt.  
In contrast to stock companies in which one large shareholder can control the 
management of the company, co-op owners have one vote per person and do not engage 
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in takeover bids. As a result, there are few checks on management in co-ops. There is a 
possibility that the large number of co-op bankruptcies may be linked to these types of 
problems in governance structure. Of course, there have been similar problems in the 
governance structure of corporate banks as well, but there have been many 
advancements in recent years with regard to strengthening the governance of 
corporations. Conversely, such advancements have not been made with regard to co-ops.  
A working group of the Finance Council established by the Financial Services Agency 
published a report in June 2009 on the status of co-ops (FSA [2009]). This report 
recommended appointing outside directors at board as a means for strengthening 
governance. According to studies analyzing the function of outside directors in stock 
companies, many evaluated the role of outside directors positively given a certain set of 
circumstances (Weisbach (1988), Daily and Dalton (1992), Byrd and Hickman (1992), 
Shivdasani (1993), Barnhart and Rosenstein (1994), Brickley et al. (1994), Kiel and 
Nicholson (2003)). However, there has been very little research on outside directors of 
co-ops. It is also unclear whether the arguments made for stock companies can simply 
be applied to co-ops, which have a unique governance structure.  
As such, this paper uses stochastic frontier analysis to verify whether the existence of 
outside directors in credit associations (“Shinkin banks”)—a kind of co-ops that carry 
substantial weight in the Japanese financial market—have an impact on management 
performance. Our results showed that the presence of outside directors contributes to 
an improvement in efficiency.  
 
 
2. Background of Analysis 
 Previous studies on the Function of outside Directors 
One of the roles of outside directors is to monitor management and thereby increase 
the efficiency. Although it is the duty of all directors to monitor management, outside 
directors are by definition people outside of the company in question, and are well 
suited for monitoring because they have another primary job and are highly 
independent from the CEO (e.g., Fama (1980), Fama and Jensen (1983)). However, 
there has been no consensus in previous studies on the relationship between the ratio of 
outside directors and management performance.   
While Daily and Dalton (1992) find that outside directors have a positive effect on 
management performance, Klein (1998) asserts that internal directors contribute more 
rather than outside directors. Furthermore, Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) could not 
find any relationship between the ratio of outside directors and management 
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performance. In short, no clear results can be found within previous studies as to 
whether external directors work their function of improving management efficiency.  
Particularly, there has been very little research in Japan that analyzes the effect of 
outside directors on management performance and efficiency; moreover, research on the 
role of outside directors in financial institutions is particularly little.  
 
Shinkin Banks and Non-Executive Directors 
Financial institutions in Japan can be divided into banks, which have a stock-based 
capital structure, and co-ops including “Shinkin bank”, which have mutual capital 
structure.1 Co-ops do not have outside directors because of the nature of the legal 
system. However, many co-ops appoint local business owners, lawyers, accountants, and 
politicians as part-time directors, and previous studies has indicated that part-time 
directors, who have a high degree of independence from the chairman of the board, may 
fulfill a role of outside directors (in corporations), and can be expected to act as a 
management monitor.  
Because they have a wealth of experience, connections, and insight, part-time directors 
are in a good position to determine whether the management of the Shinkin bank is 
headed in the right direction. Another fact that makes them advantageous as monitors 
is that they have a separate main source of income, and thus do not have to worry about 
losing their position as a part-time director if they disagree with the chairman of the 
board.  
For the Shinkin banks that were the subject of our analysis, the average number of 
part-time directors for the period spanning FY 1999 to FY 2006 fell by 0.73, from 3.69 to 
2.96 members. As a result, the share of part-time directors among total directors 
dropped from 0.34 to 0.29. 2  This trend stands in contrast to the environment 
surrounding (listed) stock companies, which have been proactively pushing for the 
appointment of outside directors because of the possibility of additional legal and listing 
standard requirements.  
 
 
3. Data and Analysis Method 
This study employs technical efficiency as an indicator of Shinkin banks’ management 
                                                   
1 In addition to the Shinkin banks that are the focus of this study’s analysis, there are 
also credit unions and agricultural cooperatives. Some life insurance companies also 
have a mutual structure. 
2 Average number of directors per Shinkin bank (total of full-time and part-time 
directors) was 10.77 in FY 1999 and 10.05 in FY 2006. 
4 
 
performance. Here, stochastic frontier analysis is used to obtain technical efficiency 
based on a cost function. To observe the differences around the time of the change in the 
management environment in recent years, we calculate individual technical efficiency 
by using cross sectional data for FY 1999 and FY 2006. More specifically, for estimated 
functional form, the following standard translog cost function is applied.  
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Here, C, Y, and P are variables for total cost, outputs, and input prices, respectively. α,
βandδ are estimation parameters. v is a standard statistical error term with N(0, σv2). 
In addition, u (u > 0) is an indicator that shows inefficiency for each Shinkin bank and is 
assumed to be uncorrelated to any of the independent variables and v.  
When estimating a stochastic frontier function, it is necessary to pre-specify the 
distribution function for the inefficiency indicator u. Here, in accordance with much of 
the previous research, we assume a half-normal distribution. Moreover, we adopt the 
indicators proposed by Battese and Coelli (1988) in individual technical efficiency, which 
is calculated using the estimated values for the parameters.3 
The following three outputs are considered: interest on loans and discounts (Y1), other 
interest income (Y2), and commissions and fees (Y3). Input prices are as follows: the 
labor price (p1; personnel expense/ number of full-time employees and directors), the 
price of fund (p2; interest expenses on deposits/ total amount of deposits), and the price 
of capital (p3; non-personnel expense/ value of movable and immovable capital). Total 
cost (C) is the sum of these three input expenses.  
 
(Table1 insert here) 
 
A regression analysis on the efficiency indicators measured in this way was performed 
to test whether the variable for governance had a statistically significant impact. For 
the governance variables that are likely to have an impact on Shinkin bank efficiency, 
                                                   
3 See Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) for details on stochastic frontier analysis. 
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we used number of directors (NS), the ratio of outside directors to all directors (ODR), 
and the size of representative council members (RCM). RCM is the number of members 
who comprise the representative council, and are elected from among the members of 
the Shinkin bank4. If larger the number of members in managerial or decision making 
institutions relate to lower efficiency, we can expect that the estimates for NS and RCM 
will have a statistically significant negative value. In addition, we incorporated control 
variables for the capital asset ratio (CAR), bad loan ratio (BLR), loan to deposit ratio 
(LDR), and log of total assets (LAS). Furthermore, in accordance with previous studies 
that reports a drop in efficiency directly following a merger, a dummy variable for 
Shinkin banks that experienced a merger for each fiscal year (MGDM) is included. 
Financial statements for Shinkin banks were obtained through “National Shinkin 
Bank Financial Statements,” published by Kinyu Tosho Consultant Sha, and 
governance variables were obtained from the “Japan Finance Directory” published by 
The Japan Financial News Co.,Ltd. Descriptive statistics for the data are given in Table 
1. Governance variables could not be obtained for a few Shinkin banks, and as such, 
there is a small discrepancy in sample numbers. 
 
 
4. Analysis results 
Based on the stochastic frontier analysis, Table 2 gives the efficiency indicators for FY 
1999 and FY 2006, Since the average efficiency for FY 2006 is greater than that for FY 
1999 and the standard deviation is smaller, we can see that there is an overall trend for 
improvement in Shinkin bank efficiency. 
 
(Table2 insert here) 
 
Table 3 displays the results of the regression analysis. In addition to an analysis that 
uses the measured efficiency indicators (Efficiency Level), we also performed an 
analysis that substituted these for ranking data within each FY sample (Efficiency 
Rank). 
First the results for FY 1999 showed that among the variables for governance, only the 
                                                   
4 Shinkin Law allows representative council to be the highest decision making body 
instead of members’ general meeting, which is equivalent to general shareholders' 
meetings for stock companies. Of course, there are several important differences 
between them. Most importantly, the members of representative council are in effect 
selected by the management and individual members of representative council have 
only one vote.  
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estimation value for NS was insignificant. Since ODR has a significant positive 
estimation value, we can see that the existence of outside directors contributes 
positively to improvements in Shinkin bank efficiency. Moreover, RCM has a significant 
negative estimation value, indicating that a streamlined decision-making body leads to 
improvements in Shinkin bank efficiency. Although the sign for each of the control 
variables does not conflict with what they should logically be, the estimates for CAR and 
MGDM were insignificant. Moreover, we conduct a likelihood ratio test to confirm 
appropriateness for including the governance variables in the estimation formula, and 
we find that the null hypothesis that the estimates for all governance variables are 0 
can be rejected at 1% significance level. 
Next, the results for FY 2006 showed that the estimates for all governance variables 
were significant. Unlike FY 1999, NS had a significant negative coefficient, indicating 
the possibility that smaller boards of directors could lead to improvements in efficiency. 
Results for ODR and NS for FY 2006 were consistent with those for FY 1999. For the 
control variables, the CAR that was insignificant in FY 1999 was significant for FY 
2006. It was confirmed that the null hypothesis that the estimates for all governance 
variables are 0 can be rejected at 1% significance level for FY 2006 as well. 
 
(Table3 insert here) 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
This study examines whether the existence of outside directors in Shinkin bank co-ops, 
which carry substantial weight in the Japanese financial market, have an impact on 
management performance. 
Results in this paper confirmed that differences in the governance structure between 
Shinkin banks have a significant effect on management performance. In particular, 
results showing that the existence of outside directors contributes to improvement in 
efficiency is an interesting outcome that dovetails with the government’s guidelines for 
improving governance at Shinkin banks. In stock companies, pressure exerted by large 
shareholders may also encourage appointment of outside directors, but in co-ops where 
each owner has only one vote, this type of pressure is absent. Thus, to ingrain an 
outside director system, pressure from regulatory authorities such as the Financial 
Services Agency is needed. 
In addition, the result that showed that the number of directors was only significant in 
FY 2006 indicates the possibility that changes in the management environment in 
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recent years has had an impact on discussions on the appropriate size of Shinkin bank 
board. 
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Table1. Descriptive statistics for estimation variables 
      
Variables 
1999   2006 
Mean Std Dev   Mean Std Dev 
TC 5,131 6,342 
 
5,490 6,573 
Y1 5,161 6,617 
 
5,301 6,709 
Y2 1,691 2,175 
 
1,933 2,308 
Y3 478 598 
 
736 950 
Pl 6.7781 0.7881 
 
7.0191 0.8700 
Pu 0.2947 0.0738 
 
0.1237 0.0417 
Pk 0.3932 0.1710 
 
0.3793 0.1581 
      
Observaions 378   287 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table2. Descriptive statistics on efficiency scores 
    
         
1999   2006 
Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
 
Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
0.9099 0.0454 0.5293 0.9756   0.9164 0.0386 0.6809 0.9764 
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Table3. Determinants of Shinkin bank efficiency 
                
Variable 
1999   2006 
Efficiency Level 
 
Efficiency Rank 
 
Efficiency Level 
 
Efficiency Rank 
Coefficient   Std. dev.   Coefficient   Std. dev.   Coefficient   t-statistic   Coefficient   t-statistic 
Constant 0.7072 
***
 0.0466 
 
-322.4830 
***
 124.7430 
 
0.7025 
***
 0.0548 
 
-162.4700 
 
118.0290 
NS -0.0001 
 
0.0011 
 
-1.1878 
 
2.0878 
 
-0.0035 
***
 0.0013 
 
-5.4133 
**
 2.3840 
ODR 0.0005 
***
 0.0001 
 
1.4292 
***
 0.3619 
 
0.0004 
**
 0.0002 
 
0.7188 
*
 0.3967 
RCM -0.0002 
***
 0.0001 
 
-0.4973 
**
 0.1971 
 
-0.0002 
**
 0.0001 
 
-0.2785 
*
 0.1620 
CAR 0.0012 
 
0.0011 
 
2.6307 
 
2.6526 
 
0.0016 
***
 0.0005 
 
3.6308 
***
 1.0546 
BLR -0.0010 
*
 0.0006 
 
-2.6628 
**
 1.2261 
 
-0.0011 
*
 0.0006 
 
-2.9415 
**
 1.3960 
LDR 0.0019 
***
 0.0003 
 
4.6781 
***
 0.6303 
 
0.0012 
***
 0.0003 
 
2.6917 
***
 0.6074 
LAS 0.0076 
**
 0.0034 
 
18.6699 
**
 9.3972 
 
0.0156 
***
 0.0045 
 
17.4182 
*
 9.3292 
MGDM -0.1409 
**
 0.0659 
 
-88.1985 
 
60.8045 
 
-0.0763 
*
 0.0391 
 
-67.7249 
 
50.0032 
                
Adj-R
2
 0.3417  
 
0.2030  
 
0.2443  
 
0.1471  
Observations 376    288  
Note: White heteroskedasticity adjusted standard error. *** and ** stand for significance at the 1% and 5% levels. 
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